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Eighteenth Century ‘Prize Negroes’: 
From Britain to America 
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Eighteenth-century Anglo-American prize systems were highly organized 
enterprises for the provision of coerced labor. Offering whites opportunities to 
participate in a lucrative market, they extended the reach of American slavery 
beyond the shores of the Americas, reinforced slavery in North America and 
greatly limited opportunities for freedom for black seamen. Although Americans 
desired that their new nation provide greater individual liberty, the American prize 
system applied the same presumption - that captured black mariners were slaves - 
as had its British predecessor, resulting in the sale of hundreds of black seamen 
into slavery. 
	  
	  
	  
On 26 June 1782 Obadiah Gale and Edward Carter entered James Esdall’s Burlington, 
New Jersey house to be sold. The two men of African descent were seamen on the 
Nancy, a sloop captured by the British privateer but thereafter recaptured by American 
privateers. The Burlington Vice-Admiralty Court had adjudged Gale and Carter, along 
with lumber and tar found on the Nancy, to be cargo that could be sold as prize goods. 
Forty-one years earlier a similar scene had taken place in Boston. Five Spanish Negro 
seamen captured by Captain Rouse’s privateer in the West Indies were sold as slaves to a 
number of Bostonians.1 
These two events, known only through a few lines in newspapers, appear to be 
random occurrences: none of the Burlington participants had any known connection to 
the individuals involved in the earlier case. The two episodes involved American, 
Spanish and British seamen in different regions of the western Atlantic. And yet a con- 
sideration of so-called ‘Prize Negroes’ within the broader context of eighteenth- century 
warfare makes it possible to understand better how Anglo-American prize systems 
shaped freedom for Atlantic mariners who were of African descent or mixed racial 
ancestry.2 
Almost continual fighting occurred in the Atlantic between 1739 and 1783: the War of 
Jenkins’ Ear, the War of Austrian Succession, the Seven Years War and finally the 
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American Revolution. During these conflicts, British and American prize systems 
inflicted considerable harm upon Britain and America’s enemies and enriched many 
seamen, officers and ship owners. Anglo-American prize systems were also highly 
organised enterprises for the provision of coerced labour that extended the reach of 
American slavery beyond the shores of the Americas, reinforcing slavery in North 
America and greatly limiting opportunities for freedom for black seamen. 
In a period when nations did not have large standing navies, private war ships used 
letters of marque to capture enemy ships. This mechanism provided a quick, low-cost 
and effective means for increasing a nation’s maritime forces. After capturing an 
enemy ship, privateers brought the vessel and its goods back to a friendly port to be 
adjudged before a Vice-Admiralty court. If vessel and goods were deemed proper 
prizes, they were sold, with the ship’s crew receiving the majority of the proceeds. 
This system rewarded successful risk-taking. The willingness of private investors and 
seamen to gamble their money and lives was the foundation of privateering.3 
Many individuals profited from prize systems. Customs officials, naval officers, 
seamen, prize agents, Vice-Admiralty court personnel, newspaper publishers, and 
maritime vendors received considerable benefits from the sale of prizes. Investments in 
privateer ships sold in small lots spread the gains. Boisterous sailors led processions 
through city streets carrying privateer ensigns. Sailors, whose motto was ‘We’ll prizes 
make of all we take’, readily abandoned naval and merchant berths for the promise of 
prize monies. Privateer captains created fortunes for ship owners and compensation for 
themselves far in excess of the wages they would have received as merchant ship- 
masters. The prospect of prize riches was dazzling to some; during wars the talk in 
American ports was of nothing other than privateering. Between 1739 and 1748 
New York’s cruisers employed more than 10,300 sailors; Newport sent a third of its 
adult males privateering; and Philadelphia’s docks hosted 4,600 privateermen.4 
Obtaining prize money attracted many, because the returns were high. Investors 
could double their stakes. Prize agents, such as Barbadian Gedney Clarke, appointed to 
sell captured booty and to distribute the proceeds fairly, could receive ‘large sums’ for 
their services. Newspaper publishers profited from the publication of adver- tisements 
proclaiming the sale of black seamen ‘found on board’ captured vessels. Admiralty 
Court judges fattened their bank accounts with hefty fees for decreeing cap- tives as prize 
goods. James Esdall and others who leased their properties for the sale of Prize Negroes 
also profited from the enslavement of sailors.5 
Prize systems not only enriched individuals but also played a significant role in sup- 
porting local economies. Western Atlantic ports often relied on plunder obtained by 
their privateers. For example, during King George’s War, New York’s privateers cap- 
tured seventy-nine ships resulting in prizes totaling £615,000. At the commencement of 
the Revolution, Salem’s merchants converted their fishing vessels to privateers. The scores 
of prizes these privateers brought into Salem sustained the port during the war.6 
Anglo-American prize systems affected considerable numbers of black seamen 
within the western Atlantic. Black mariners comprised nearly half of Bermuda’s sailors, 
were commonplace in Antigua, and totalled almost 3 per cent of the crews on Royal 
Navy ships on the North American station during the American Revolution. 
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South Carolinian and Chesapeake planters regularly employed slaves as boatmen, 
patroons, pilots and ship captains. Hundreds of black sailors were shipped from 
British North America ports. A 1743 census of North American ships at Kingston dis- 
closed 41 black seamen among the ships’ 135 mariners.7 The combination of a lack of 
work for some slaves, the benefit of not having to pay a white seaman wages, and the 
promise of substantial prize monies led some masters to risk the loss of their bonds- 
men, whether by enemy cannon or slave flight. Black mariners were particularly 
numerous on privateers. The Newport privateer Revenge with four blacks – a cook, 
mate’s servant, drummer and free seaman – was far from exceptional. With ship cap- 
tains often desperate for crew members, many ‘encourage[d] Negroes to run away to sea’, 
leading British colonial authorities to complain of ‘the wooly haired race’ filling vessels 
and Spanish colonial officials bemoaning that their ports were ‘filling up with 
foreigners’. Sailors of African descent could also be found on ships from Spanish 
American ports, Curac¸ ao, and the French West Indies.8 
In a world where slavery was ubiquitous, people of African and mixed racial descent 
were potential targets for Anglo-American ship captains, merchants and seamen 
looking for easy profits. Ship captains regularly took black men from on land and 
from vessels of all kinds, and sold them into slavery. Just as privateers profited from the 
capture of whole slaving ships, they benefited by seizing vulnerable individuals 
– none more so than persons of African descent – throughout the Atlantic world.9 
In wartime in particular, the propensity to see blacks as ‘marketable commodities’ 
critical to ‘military success’ intensified. Ships of all nations regularly raided enemy 
settlements to take away slaves; and, in response, naval ships patrolled coastlines to 
prevent such incursions. Ship captains kidnapped black men either to sell them into 
slavery or to coerce them into becoming mariners. Kidnappings of black mariners 
were the subject of London plays, commentary by Samuel Johnson and appeared in an 
early novel.10 
Were abductions of black mariners by British and American ships random acts of 
uncivilised behaviour confined largely to wartime or were they part of a larger pattern 
pointing to the vulnerability of blacks being enslaved? The answer lies in the prevalence 
of Prize Negroes throughout the eighteenth century. The Prize Negro sailors Captain 
Rouse sold into slavery in 1741 were but the tip of an iceberg. Between 1721 and 1748 
at least one hundred and thirty-five black mariners were con- demned as prize goods. 
During the American Revolution, references to more than 250 
Prize Negroes appeared in Pennsylvania, Delaware, New York, New Jersey and Rhode 
Island newspapers. Overall, the number of Prize Negroes in North America from 1713 to 
1783 is estimated to exceed 500.11 Condemning black seamen into slavery in North 
American prize courts is prima facie evidence of Britons and Americans seeing these 
men as subject to enslavement due to their skin colour. 
Still, not every black mariner captured at sea was sold into slavery. When capturing an 
enemy ship, privateering ship captains encountered the problem of what to do with as 
many as 100 seamen. If the privateer had previously captured other ships the sailors it 
placed on the vessels as prize crews would have reduced its crew. When faced with the 
difficulties of, say, supervising prisoners, most ship captains, such as Captain 
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Norton when he ‘landed’ 24 of a captured crew while retaining ‘7 Negroes and 3 
Spaniards’, probably kept the ‘valuable negro men’ while releasing white prisoners.12 
Notwithstanding the financial incentive involved in capturing black tars, some were 
released: elderly cooks had limited value, and if a cruiser had just begun a voyage, the 
burden of provisioning additional seamen for weeks or months was prohibitive. 
Privateers with small crews often resorted to ransoming a captured ship to avoid 
having to supervise prisoners. To evade the cost of court proceedings, some ship cap- 
tains simply sold captured black men without going through proper legal channels. 
With Prize Negroes enslaved during both the colonial era and the Revolution War, did 
the British and American prize systems differ, and if so, how? A consideration of the two 
systems’ procedures, black seamen’s opportunities to oppose prize proceedings and the 
means black sailors used to resist their enslavement demonstrates that the two systems 
were very similar, with a British black seaman having as much to fear from an American 
privateer during the Revolution as a Spanish or French black sailor did from a British ship 
in the colonial era. The reasons for this included standards of proof that favoured the 
capturing ship, the speed of prize proceedings under both systems, black seamen’s very 
limited ability to oppose the prize proceedings, restricted possibilities for black 
seamen’s national governments to influence the outcome of prize cases and 
circumscribed opportunities for black sailors to escape enslavement once con- demned 
as prize goods. 
 
 
British Colonial Prize System 
 
Prize cases were commenced in British colonies by the filing of a libel with a Vice- 
Admiralty court seeking the condemnation of the captured ship and its cargo. Ship 
captains were required to bring into port officers of the captured ship to permit their 
answering standing interrogatories detailing the circumstances of the capture. Prize 
captors only needed to establish ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the property was subject to 
condemnation. The owner of a captured ship bore the burden of proving the contrary. 
In cases where there was ‘heavy suspicion’ as to the veracity of a petition, procedures of the 
time provided that rather than simply adjudicating the matter on the pleadings alone, 
opponents of the libel were permitted to examine witnesses and administer 
interrogatories.13  As written, such procedures seem quite reasonable. Their practical 
effect was, however, to offer few free black sailors the opportunity to present an effective 
defense in prize proceedings. 
When captured black seamen appeared before Vice-Admiralty courts, the pervasive 
presumption was that they were in fact slaves. The long-standing British policy was to 
enslave black mariners regardless of whether or not they were free subjects of England’s 
enemies. As New York Governor Hunter acknowledged in 1712, such men had been 
enslaved ‘by reason of their colour’. The Governor refused to release the seamen, as 
they provided no evidence other than ‘their own words’.14   While Vice-Admiralty courts 
had the power to condemn as prizes only those who were enemy property, that is, 
slaves when captured, judges typically ignored this constraint. In 1744 when Captain 
Dennis sought to condemn a ‘Negro’ on the St Fermin, the Rhode Island 
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Vice-Admiralty Court disregarded the testimony of the St. Fermin’s captain that the 
sailor was a ‘free man’ and had him sold as a prize good. New York’s Vice-Admiralty 
Court made similar decisions. Rarely did a Vice-Admiralty court express ‘some doubt’ 
whether captured black mariners were ‘Free or Slave’.15 In the absence of written docu- 
mentation of free status, courts assumed the sailors to be slaves. 
Once condemned as Prize Negroes, free black seamen faced daunting hurdles to 
regain their free status. Courts often offered little recourse to captured black mariners. 
Typically, notices of Vice-Admiralty hearings to condemn Prize Negroes appeared in 
newspapers within 10 days of seamen being brought into port. Most prize proceedings 
were uncontested and rapidly dispatched. The 11 ‘Negroes’ Captain Dennis sent to 
Boston in 1744 were peremptorily condemned as prize goods the same day they 
arrived in port. Such expeditious proceedings occurred frequently. Even when black 
mariners presented written testimony of their free status, Vice-Admiralty courts barred 
their release. For example, in 1749 New York’s Vice-Admiralty Court held that an 
affidavit attesting to a seamen’s free status was insufficient because it did not come 
from the seaman’s place of birth.16  Such procedural roadblocks to freedom were 
common. 
The barriers that kept Prize Negroes from re-obtaining freedom were not solely due to 
Vice-Admiralty court procedures. White purchasers of black seamen often went to 
extraordinary lengths to keep the men from returning to their homes. Slave owners 
employed a variety of methods to keep Prize Negroes from proceeding with freedom 
suits, including placing their bondsmen in workhouses, locking them in private homes 
or secreting them in the countryside.17 
While depriving enemies of skilled maritime labour, the British prize system also 
served to support British colonists’ own labour needs. During the conflicts with Spain 
many indentured servants enlisted in the armed forces. At the same time slave imports 
into British North American colonies slowed considerably. New York and 
Pennsylvania’s  experiences illustrate this decline well. New York’s  average annual slave 
imports fell from 177 slaves in the period between 1713 and 1775 to 
37 slaves from 1740 to 1748. Pennsylvania experienced a similarly sharp fall in slave 
imports. While only 10 slaves were imported annually into Pennsylvania from 1743 to 
1748, in the 5 years prior to the conflict an average of 71 slaves were annually 
imported. In such circumstances Prize Negroes served as useful replacements.18 
The British prize system affected the lives of all black mariners, both those caught in its 
claws and those not yet drawn into the system. Its very presence caused black 
seaman and their masters to take steps to limit the risk of condemnation as prize 
goods. Among Bermuda’s large enslave black mariner population it was ‘very 
customary’ for slave sailors to carry papers asserting their status as free men. They did 
so ‘in Case they should be taken by the Enemy’. Even some young black boys on 
North American vessels carried certificates from their masters identifying them as ‘free’. 
With no place to hide when confronted at sea, black sailors hoped that these passes 
might protect them when brought before a prize court. The passes often provided 
limited protection. Colonial governors argued that mariners may 
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have forged the certificates and refused to release captured black seamen without 
additional proof of free status, often impossible to obtain when hundreds of miles 
away from home.19 
Black sailors who were condemned as prize goods were generally isolated and 
removed from family and friends, but occasionally they created new communities. The 
most notable social network of Prize Negroes in the colonial era involved Spanish 
sailors in New York during the 1730s to 1750s. Scores of Spanish seamen, mostly of 
African descent, passed through Justice Lewis Morris’s Vice-Admiralty Court before 
congregating on the city’s congested streets, drinking and socialising together. Their 
numbers included six Spanish black seamen charged in 1741 with con- spiracy to 
overthrow New York’s government, Juan Miranda, a black seaman who was coercively 
kept in the city for more than 20 years as a slave although never formally condemned, 
and ‘Negro Mingo’ who attempted to seize control of a Bermudian boat sailing from 
New York.20 This social network was undoubtedly a response to the sailors’ isolation 
and British colonists’ hatred of Spaniards. As one New York news- paper dispatch noted, 
‘there are many [Spanish Negroes] in this place’, who, if the Spanish or French 
invaded the colony, would ‘rise and join’ Britain’s enemies.21 In the 1740s, concerns 
over Spanish intentions and anti-Catholic bias led many whites to take seriously 
Georgia Governor Oglethorpe’s warning that ‘Spaniards had imployed Emissaries to 
burn all the Magazines and considerable Towns in the English North America’. In an 
environment where both skin colour and nationality rendered Prize Negroes 
suspicious, Spanish black seamen naturally combined to make their enslavement a 
little more bearable.22 
The enslavement of Prize Negroes had unintended circumstances. Spanish Prize 
Negroes often were leaders in resisting slavery in British North America. As with the 
four Spanish Negroes who murdered the crew of the ship transporting them as 
prizes, many captured Spanish black seamen believed that ‘they were born Freemen, and 
made Slaves by the English during the War, and had no other Way left of getting their 
Liberty’. This strong belief in their free status resulted in Spanish Negroes organising 
other slaves to flee. Their leadership sometimes involved violent attacks. The ‘great 
number of Spanish’ black mariners, who, along with ‘other Prize Negroes’ rioted in 
Newport in 1743, believed that violence was an effective means to regaining their 
freedom. These men’s violence speaks both to their frustration at being enslaved, as 
well as the frequency with which British ship captains enslaved Spanish black sailors.23 
Prize Negroes also understood that their maritime experience made them ideal can- 
didates for employment on North American privateers. With many ship captains 
lacking full crews during wartime, captains often recruited, as Jeffrey Bolster has 
noted, with ‘more of an eye to muscle than complexion’. Willing to hire runaway 
slaves and free blacks, shipmasters often proved amenable to employing Prize Negroes 
such as the ex-Spanish privateerman George who ‘endeavour[ed] to get on board some 
Vessel’.24 Other former Prize Negroes, such as two groups of ‘Spanish Negroes’ 
belonging to John Cannon, chose to flee enslavement by stealing sloops and small 
boats.25 
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The enslavement of Spanish black sailors also affected relationships between English 
and Spanish governments. For example, in 1746 when Newport ship captain William 
Dennis had 22 Spanish prisoners sold as slaves based on their skin colour, Havana’s 
Governor protested. The Governor not only exchanged acerbic letters with his 
counterpart, but also had 19 of Captain Dennis’ men taken hostage. Officials in Rhode 
Island, New York and Pennsylvania scrambled to recover the Spanish black sailors so 
that Dennis’ seamen could be freed. Contacting Spanish governmental offi- cials was 
usually critical to obtaining freedom, but it was not failsafe. As Santiago, a free Spanish 
black man, captured by a British vessel and sold in Rhode Island found out, sometimes 
a slave owner’s connections could trump Spanish governmental auth- ority. In the same 
year as the nine ‘Spanish Negroes’ in Rhode Island gained their freedom through the 
intercession of the Governor of Havana, a Rhode Island master sent Santiago on a 
voyage to the West Indies. He attempted to escape in Havana. Unfortunately for 
Santiago, his master’s business associate in Cuba had him recaptured and sold, despite 
evidence that ‘he [wa]s a Free Man’.26 
Prize Negroes who were successful in obtaining their freedom under the British 
colonial prize system often had to engage in lengthy endeavours to do so; some cases 
lasted for more than a decade. Most of those who were successful had either the 
assistance of the Spanish government or that of the New York Attorney General, but 
what was most noteworthy about these seamen’s struggles was that they resulted in a 
sea-change in how prize cases were handled by Vice-Admiralty courts in North 
America. Although black seamen were condemned as Prize Negroes during the Seven 
Years War, the numbers of such enslaved mariners was but a fraction of those who lost 
their freedom in previous wars. This was largely due to the fact, that in response to 
the numerous freedom suits filed in the 1740s and 1750s, Vice-Admiralty courts began to 
place the burden of proof on libellants and not captured seamen as to whether the 
sailors were free or enslaved subjects of their native lands.27 Unfortunately for black 
mariners, this change was not to be adopted by American admiralty judges. 
 
 
American Prize System 
 
Three decades after scores of black Spanish mariners were enslaved through the efforts of 
privateers operating under British letters of marque, the new American nation faced a 
decision about developing a maritime force to combat the formidable Royal Navy. 
Although by November 1776 the Continental Navy had 13 ships, the majority had 
very short fighting lives, with almost all out of commission by 1779. Lacking a strong 
naval presence Americans relied upon privateers. Congress established a prize system 
adapting British legal and maritime precedents. When it authorised pri- vateers to seize 
‘all Goods’ on British ships, it did not define the phrase ‘goods’. Instead, letters of marque 
issued to privateers provided that the legitimacy of a prize was to be determined by ‘usage 
in such cases at the Port’. Although Congress provided that ‘all persons taken in arms 
on board any prize be deemed prisoners’ and treated ‘with humanity’, neither 
American ship captains nor courts of admiralty interpreted this res- olution to require 
that black mariners be treated as prisoners of war. Instead, rather 
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than establishing a new American jurisprudence emphasising individual liberty, Amer- ican 
courts of admiralty followed British ‘usage’ from the first half of the eighteenth 
century.28 
Given that Congressional rules provided for local determinations of the condemn- 
ing of prizes, variations in how courts treated captured black sailors can be expected. 
Uniformity largely reigned, however, with only Massachusetts rejecting the presump- tion 
that black tars were slaves. As early as 1776 the Massachusetts Legislature prohib- ited the 
sale of two black ‘prisoners taken on the high seas’ as being ‘in violation of the natural 
rights alike vested in all men by their Creator’. Six years later the Massachusetts Vice-
Admiralty court offered 70 captured Bermudian slave mariners their freedom. 
Apparently, the court was unwilling to assume that a black seaman should be enslaved in 
a state with a constitution providing equal rights for all men.29 Yet the Massachu- setts 
exception did not save many black tars from enslavement. The 1776 legislative 
resolution simply put privateer captains on notice to steer clear of Massachusetts 
when they had black seamen to be condemned; and many did. With British forces 
occupying Newport and New York for most of the Revolution, American privateers 
brought prizes to Delaware River ports such as Philadelphia, Burlington and Trenton 
where judges proved quite willing to condemn scores of black sailors as prize goods. 
Admiralty Court judges in Delaware River ports, as well as Williamsburg and Pro- 
vidence worked from the assumption that a black mariner was a slave. Whether they 
were captured on a British merchant ship, found working on a British supply sloop, or 
members of a Bermudian privateer, black sailors were treated as property appropriate for 
sale as prize goods.30 
Most prize proceedings during the American Revolution were uncontested and 
rapidly dispatched. For Tom and other young black boys captured at sea, such expe- 
ditious proceedings in which they found themselves appraised and sold by strangers 
within a matter of days must have been quite alienating.31 Fewer than a dozen cap- 
tured black sailors avoided being condemned as prizes. In each case prize courts 
released these men only because their American owners provided proof of ownership. 
In contrast to the expeditious condemnation of captured black mariners as prize 
goods, American officials could take considerable care to ensure the return of slaves 
recaptured from enemy ships to their American owners. In 1779, 34 slaves taken 
from South Carolinian plantations by a British privateer were recaptured by the Mas- 
sachusetts naval ships the Hazard and Tyrannicide. When the prize ship and the slaves 
were brought into Boston, the Board of War appointed a three-person committee to 
resolve what to do with the captured Negroes. The committee issued a resolution 
directing the Board of War to notify Congress of the facts of the case and to have 
the Negroes housed in barracks on Castle Island. The committee sought to have Con- 
gress give the information to the South Carolinian delegates so ‘proper measures may be 
taken for the return of said Negroes, agreeable to their desire’.32 
For black tars, such as the two Virginians who escaped onto a British frigate, later 
transferred to a British merchant ship, then captured by an American privateer and 
returned to their owners by the Norfolk Vice-Admiralty Court, America’s prize 
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system represented governmental support of the slave system they sought to escape. By 
returning captured fugitives to their former owners, American prize courts empha- 
sised property rather than individual rights in the same way that colonial British Vice-
Admiralty courts had.33 
Despite American courts’ concern for whites’ property rights in their bondsmen, 
expeditious resolution and payment of prize monies appeared to take precedent in 
the Revolutionary prize courts. Thus, although clearly slaves of a Bermudian, James 
Jackson and Jacob Smith found themselves sold as prize goods in Virginia within a 
week of notice of their sale.34 Such quick sales gave owners of black seamen, American or 
other nationalities, little time to compile the necessary paperwork, hire a proctor and 
file opposition papers. 
As the British prize system did during earlier colonial conflicts, the American prize 
system during the Revolution provided bondsmen for Americans at a time when the 
usual sources of slaves were unavailable. From 1776 to 1782 only a single African slave ship 
entered a port in the 13 former colonies. With hundreds of slaves fleeing across British 
lines, and many indentured servants enlisting in the military, colonists who desired 
bound labour had limited choices; Prize Negroes captured by American priva- teers made 
handy replacement workers. Thus, while some northern states enacted gradual 
abolition laws and some whites were willing to offer freedom to enslaved mar- iners, other 
whites preferred to profit from Prize Negroes.35 
The conflict with Great Britain caused considerable fear among whites about slave 
flight. Hundreds of slaves fled their owners via the sea. Fugitive slaves in the Chesa- 
peake area regularly stole small boats to flee to Wilmington, Philadelphia, or Royal 
Navy ships. Black sailors assisted Loyalists in attacking rebels; when a Philadelphia pri- 
vateer captured the sloop Lady Susan as it sought to ‘join the British fleet under Lord 
Dunmore’, it seized seven Bermudian enslaved mariners. The selling of black mariners as 
prizes served as a means of limiting maritime flight and combating British forces. In their 
anxious response to such individuals fleeing to and fighting for British forces, 
American authorities often made no distinction in their treatment of fugitive slaves, 
enslaved sailors, and free black mariners. All were viewed as agents of instability who 
needed to be restrained.36 
During the Revolution, Prize Negroes found re-obtaining freedom very difficult. 
Britain had little interest in arranging exchanges of captured privateer crews. Nor did 
British officials make efforts such as Spanish representatives had done earlier in the 
century to assist captured black mariners. This was probably due to Britain viewing the 
war as a civil uprising and being unwilling to acknowledge or confer in any manner 
legitimacy upon American admiralty courts. Moreover, the nature of the Revolution 
made captured seamen obtaining documentation to demonstrate one’s free status very 
complicated. With British ships controlling much of the Atlantic coastline and opposing 
armies often between where a captured sailor was brought and his home port, quick 
communication with relatives and friends was often not possible. When combined with 
the expeditiousness of prize proceedings, these factors guaran- teed that captured black 
tars had little chance in effectively opposing petitions seeking their sale. 
388 	  
 
Prize Negroes were able to resist their enslavement (or re-enslavement) by more tra- 
ditional means – flight. Enslaved black mariners put their maritime experiences to 
good use. Men such as Patrick Dennis, a Negro ‘taken in the prize sloop Racehorse’, when 
they fled their new slave masters, headed for ports ‘in hopes of making his escape in 
some of the vessels there ready to sail’. For Dennis, he sought to find freedom on a 
ship leaving Wilmington. Other Prize Negroes headed to New York.37 
Such flight was not always successful. Some who fled by stealing an armed boat, 
found themselves captured when serving on a Loyalist galley and then sold as a Prize 
Negro.38 
During the American Revolution, black mariners typically viewed American, and not 
British, ships as coercive tools of tyrannical power. When captured by Royal Navy 
vessels, James Forten and other black mariners were offered employment. Men such 
as Anthony Mingus, a ‘Spanish Negro’ captured by HMS Brune, had lengthy careers 
in the Royal Navy.39 Captured black seamen who declined service ended up in British 
prisons, perhaps to die a slow death, but rarely sold into slavery. Americans treated 
captured black tars very differently. American courts of admiralty ensured that 
patriotic seamen got their just rewards of prize monies but captured black mariners 
had limited opportunities to safeguard their freedom. Aboli- tionists convinced the 
Pennsylvania legislature to provide for gradual emancipation, but the fate of Prize 
Negroes condemned at the State House and sold at the Coffee House in Philadelphia 
failed to capture their attention. For whatever reason – a com- bination of patriotism, 
economics, and racism – Americans accepted a governmen- tally sanctioned system 
whereby captured black seamen were enslaved simply on the basis of their skin colour. 
As a result, during the Revolution the Atlantic Ocean between South Carolina and 
New York was a transition zone where freedom for blacks on both sides of the 
conflict was fluid and where freedom for many black mar- iners was usually fleeting.40 
The capture and recapture of ships, the contingencies of war, and the attitudes of 
individual captains all made freedom at sea a game of roulette over which black mariners 
had little control. For those black sailors sold at Philadel- phia’s Coffee House in the 
waning years of the American Revolution, the vibrant black community that James 
Forten, Richard Allen, Absalom Jones and others would forge was a far-off dream too 
bitter to contemplate. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
For Obadiah Gale and the hundreds of other black mariners sold into slavery during 
the American Revolution, the newly established American prize system was little 
different from its British colonial predecessor. Both systems presumed that blackness 
equaled enslavement. The two systems each allowed little opportunity for captured 
mariners to establish that they were free, although in the earlier colonial system the 
absence of large-scale enemy forces nearby made it easier for the captured men to 
contact friends and governmental officials to seek assistance. Even when Prize Negroes 
were able to obtain governmental assistance, they still found themselves enslaved for 
considerable periods of time. With both systems predicated upon a 
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desire to develop maritime forces through awarding prize monies, little priority was 
given to black mariners’ individual liberty. As a result, British and American prize 
systems ensured that going to sea involved anxiety for black seamen and their loved 
ones. 
The practice of enslaving captured black mariners died slowly. During America’s 
undeclared wars with European powers in the 1790s, Prize Negroes continued to be 
sold in American ports. While their numbers never reached the levels seen in the 
1740s and the Revolutionary era, Americans continued condemning Prize Negroes 
until the end of the eighteenth century. The American prize system, as did its British 
colonial predecessor, in acting to limit black seamen’s mobility and restrict their 
freedom, were precursors for the harsh Negro Seamen’s Acts enacted in the nine- teenth 
century.41 
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